Row-level authorization
Every table enforces tenant and workspace membership in the database, including negative cross-tenant paths.
Your data is encrypted before it leaves your device, with keys that never reach our servers. This page explains exactly how — and what we can and cannot see.
Every layer is created and used on your device. The server stores only the wrapped, encrypted output of each step.
Your login password and your vault password are separate. Signing in proves who you are; only the vault password decrypts.
Every table enforces tenant and workspace membership in the database, including negative cross-tenant paths.
Domain-bound passkeys and authenticator-app 2-step verification. Account sign-in never unlocks the vault on its own.
Strict Content Security Policy, HSTS, no framing, no third-party trackers, and no-store caching on sensitive routes.
k-anonymity: only the first five characters of a SHA-1 hash leave your device, padded so response size reveals nothing.
Organization events are hash-chained, append-only and exportable as CSV or JSON evidence.
Keys are zeroed after use, the vault locks on idle and when the app is hidden, and clipboard copies clear automatically.
Passkey-X is not yet SOC 2 or ISO 27001 certified. Our admin console, policies, access reviews and hash-chained audit trail produce the evidence those frameworks ask for, and Enterprise customers receive architecture and data-flow documentation on request.
Found a vulnerability? Tell us privately at security@passkey-x.com or through the form below, and give us a reasonable time to fix it before disclosure. Test only with accounts you own, and do not access other users’ data, run denial-of-service tests or degrade the service.
Safe harbor: if you act in good faith and follow these rules, we will not take legal action against you or ask others to, and we will work with you to understand and fix the issue.
Report a security issue Never include real passwords or recovery keys in a report.No. Your vault is encrypted on your device with keys derived from a vault password we never receive. Our servers store ciphertext.
An attacker would obtain encrypted data and would still need to guess each user’s vault password against Argon2id with 64 MiB of memory per guess. Use a long, unique vault password.
No. Admins can enforce policies, manage access to shared workspaces and see aggregate risk counts, but cannot decrypt anyone’s items.
Use the recovery key you saved during setup. Without it, nobody — including Passkey-X — can recover the vault.
Not yet. Our controls are designed to support those frameworks, and customers receive audit exports and architecture documentation today. We will publish attestations here when they are complete.
We’ll walk through the architecture, threat model and audit evidence with your reviewers.